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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs Bobbi-Jo Smiley, Amber Blow, and Kelsey 
Turner appeal the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees E.I. DuPont De Nemours & 
Company and Adecco USA, Inc. (collectively, “DuPont”) on 
their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and 
Collection Law (“WPCL”), 43 P.S. § 260.1, et seq.  Plaintiffs 
filed a putative collective action and class action against 
DuPont, seeking overtime compensation for time they spent 
donning and doffing their uniforms and protective gear and 
performing “shift relief” before and after their regularly-
scheduled shifts.  DuPont contended that it could offset 
compensation it gave Plaintiffs for meal breaks during their 
shift—for which DuPont was not required to provide 
compensation under the FLSA—against such required 
overtime.   
 The District Court agreed with DuPont.  We conclude 
that the FLSA and applicable regulations, as well as our 
precedent in Wheeler v. Hampton Twp., 399 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 
2005), compel the opposite result and will therefore reverse 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand 
for further proceedings. 
I.  
 Appellants worked twelve-hour shifts at DuPont’s 
manufacturing plant in Towanda, Pennsylvania.1  In addition 
                                              
 1 DuPont directly employed Bobbi-Jo Smiley and 
Amber Blow.  Adecco employed hourly contract employees 
at the Towanda plant, including Kelsey Turner.   
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to working their twelve-hour shifts, Plaintiffs had to be on-
site before and after their shifts to “don and doff” uniforms 
and protective gear.  DuPont also required them to participate 
in “shift relief,” which involved employees from the outgoing 
shift sharing information about the status of work with 
incoming shift employees.  The time spent donning, doffing, 
and providing shift relief varied, but ranged from 
approximately thirty to sixty minutes a day. 
 
 DuPont chose to compensate Plaintiffs for meal 
breaks2—despite no FLSA requirement to do so—during their 
twelve-hour shifts.  The employee handbook set forth 
DuPont’s company policy for compensating meal breaks, 
stating that “[e]mployees working in areas requiring 24 hour 
per day staffing and [who] are required to make shift relief 
will be paid for their lunch time as part of their scheduled 
work shift.”  Employees who worked twelve-hour, four-shift 
schedules, as did Plaintiffs in this case, were entitled to one 
thirty minute paid lunch break per shift, in addition to two 
non-consecutive thirty minute breaks.  The paid break time 
always exceeded the amount of time Plaintiffs spent donning 
and doffing and providing shift relief. 
 
DuPont treated the compensation for meal breaks 
similarly to other types of compensation given to employees.  
It included the compensation given for paid meal breaks when 
it calculated employees’ regular rate of pay, and meal break 
time was included in employees’ paystubs as part of their 
total hours worked each week.   
 
                                              
 2 The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ meal breaks were 
bona fide breaks. 
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Plaintiffs brought this putative collective action and 
class action against DuPont, claiming that DuPont violated 
the FLSA and WPCL by requiring Plaintiffs to work before 
and after their twelve-hour shifts without paying them 
overtime, i.e., time and one-half, compensation.  Plaintiffs 
sought to recover overtime compensation for time spent 
donning and doffing their uniforms and protective gear and 
performing shift relief.  DuPont argued that their claims fail 
because it could offset the paid breaks DuPont voluntarily 
provided Plaintiffs against the unpaid donning and doffing 
and shift-relief time.  Plaintiffs filed a motion to conditionally 
certify a FLSA collective action, which the District Court 
granted.  Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a notice of the FLSA class to 
the prospective class members, and more than 160 workers 
opted in.  Following the close of discovery, DuPont filed its 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
The District Court granted DuPont’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the FLSA allowed DuPont 
to use paid non-work time to offset the required overtime and 
dismissing the lawsuit entirely.3  The District Court held that 
Plaintiffs were not owed any additional compensation 
because the amount of paid non-work time exceeded unpaid 
work time.  Although it recognized that “[t]he FLSA does not 
expressly grant employers permission to use paid non-work 
time to offset unpaid work time,” App. 12, the District Court 
nonetheless concluded offset was not specifically prohibited 
and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of DuPont. 
 
                                              
 3 The District Court assumed, without deciding, that 
Plaintiffs’ pre- and post-shift work was compensable under 
the FLSA.   
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Prior to oral argument, we invited the Department of 
Labor (“DOL”) to file an amicus brief to assist us in 
understanding the intricacies of the important FLSA issue 
presented by this case.  At our request, the DOL and DuPont 
each filed letter briefs further addressing how we should 
analyze the issue of offsetting paid non-work time against 
unpaid time worked under the FLSA.  We are to give 
deference to the DOL’s position and guidelines under 
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  See Madison v. Res. 
for Human Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“[I]nformal agency interpretations in ‘opinion letters and 
similar documents’ are . . . . ‘entitled to respect’ under 
Skidmore v. Swift . . . but only to the extent they have the 
‘power to persuade.’”) (internal footnote omitted).  Under 
Skidmore, “[t]he weight of [an agency’s] judgment in a 
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.   
 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s interpretation of the FLSA and its grant of summary 
judgment.  Rosano v. Twp. of Teaneck, 754 F.3d 177, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  Additionally, we note that “the FLSA must be 
construed liberally in favor of employees” and “exemptions 
should be construed narrowly, that is, against the employer.”  
Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 
2008).  
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II.  
 To provide context for the ultimate issue before us, we 
begin by reviewing the contours of the FLSA and the 
circumstances in which an employer may offset compensation 
already given to an employee against required overtime. 4 
A. Overtime and Calculating Regular Rate Under the 
FLSA  
 
 We have noted that the FLSA has a “broad remedial 
purpose.”  De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 
373 (3d Cir. 2007).  “The central aim of the Act was to 
                                              
4 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint also alleges claims 
under the WPCL.  The District Court below did not evaluate 
the WPCL claim, and the parties have not significantly 
briefed the WPCL claim on appeal.  We have recognized that 
“[t]he FLSA and WPCL are parallel federal and state laws.”  
De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 
2003).  However, their parallel nature does not mean that they 
are identical, and material differences between the two claims 
could exist.  See, e.g., id. at 309–10 (“Even then, whether an 
implied contract may give rise to a claim under the WPCL 
has never been addressed by the Pennsylvania state courts and 
will require additional testimony and proof to substantiate 
beyond that required for the FLSA action.”); id. at 309 n.13 
(“There are some differences in the comprehensiveness of the 
federal and state remedies as well since the FLSA remedy is 
only for overtime pay and the WPCL remedy is broader.”).  
As the FLSA claim was the thrust of both the District Court 
opinion and briefing before this Court, we express no view on 
the merits of the WPCL claim. 
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achieve . . . certain minimum labor standards.”  Mitchell v. 
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).  
The Act established baseline standards through “federal 
minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees 
that cannot be modified by contract.”  Genesis Healthcare 
Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013).   
 
 Among the bedrock principles of the FLSA is the 
requirement that employers pay employees for all hours 
worked.  29 C.F.R. § 778.223 (“Under the Act an employee 
must be compensated for all hours worked.”); see also 
Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 913 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“One of the principal purposes of the FLSA is to 
ensure that employees are provided appropriate compensation 
for all hours worked.”) (emphasis in original).  Pursuant to 
the FLSA, employers cannot employ any employee “for a 
workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee 
receives compensation for his employment . . . at a rate not 
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he 
is employed.”  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  In other words, 
employers are required to compensate employees for time in 
excess of forty hours with overtime compensation, which is 
paid at a rate of one and one-half times the employee’s 
regular rate of pay.   
 
 The regular rate at which an employee is paid for 
“straight time”—or the first forty hours of work in a week—is 
integral to the issue of overtime payment under the FLSA.  
The regular rate is determined by way of a calculation.  It is a 
“rate per hour” that “is determined by dividing [the] total 
remuneration for employment (except statutory exclusions) in 
any workweek by the total number of hours actually worked 
by him in that workweek for which such compensation was 
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paid.”  29 C.F.R. § 778.109.  Thus, the regular rate is a 
readily definable mathematical calculation that is explicitly 
controlled by the FLSA.  Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds 
Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424–25 (1945) (“Once the 
parties have decided upon the amount of wages and the mode 
of payment the determination of the regular rate becomes a 
matter of mathematical computation, the result of which is 
unaffected by any designation of a contrary ‘regular rate’ in 
the wage contracts.”).  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
the regular rate “is not an arbitrary label chosen by the 
parties; it is an actual fact,” that “by its very nature must 
reflect all payments which the parties have agreed shall be 
received regularly during the workweek, exclusive of 
overtime payments.”  Id. at 424; 29 C.F.R. § 778.108 (citing 
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446 (1948), and 
Walling, 325 U.S. at 419).  There are two components to the 
calculation: (1) the dividend, which includes total 
remuneration minus statutory exclusions; and (2) the divisor, 
which includes all hours worked.  See 29 C.F.R. § 778.109.  
 
 The FLSA characterizes the compensation that must be 
included in the dividend of the regular rate calculation 
broadly.  It “include[s] all remuneration for employment paid 
to, or on behalf of, the employee” except the exclusions that 
are listed in section 207(e)(1)-(8).  29 U.S.C. § 207(e) 
(emphasis added).  Further, “[o]nly the statutory exclusions 
are authorized. . . . [A]ll remuneration for employment paid 
which does not fall within one of these seven exclusionary 
clauses must be added into the total compensation received by 
the employee before his regular hourly rate of pay is [to be] 
determined.”  29 C.F.R. § 778.200(c) (emphasis added).  We 
have recognized that “there are several exceptions to the 
otherwise all-inclusive rule set forth in section 207(e),” but 
11 
 
the statutory exclusions “are narrowly construed, and the 
employer bears the burden of establishing [that] an exemption 
[applies].”  Minizza v. Stone Container Corp. Corrugated 
Container Div. E. Plant, 842 F.2d 1456, 1459 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(internal citations omitted).  Thus, although a handful of types 
of compensation are statutorily excluded from the definition 
of “all remuneration,” all other compensation is included in 
the regular rate.    
 
 The divisor in the regular rate calculation is comprised 
of all “hours worked.”  29 C.F.R. § 778.223.  “Hours worked” 
includes all hours worked “under [an employee’s] contract 
(express or implied) or under any applicable statute.”  29 
C.F.R. § 778.315.  In general, “hours worked” includes time 
when an employee is required to be on duty, but it is not 
limited to “active productive labor” and may include 
circumstances that are not productive work time.  See 29 
C.F.R. § 778.223.  Employers have a measure of flexibility in 
determining whether otherwise non-productive work time 
will be considered “hours worked” under the FLSA.  For 
instance, meal periods—while not necessarily productive 
work time—may nevertheless be considered “hours worked” 
under the Act.  Id. (“Some of the hours spent by employees . . 
. in meal periods . . . are regarded as working time and some 
are not. . . . To the extent that those hours are regarded as 
working time, payment made as compensation for these hours 
obviously cannot be characterized as ‘payments not for hours 
worked.’”).  The decision to treat otherwise non-productive 
work time as “hours worked” is fact dependent.  Relevant 
here, the regulations provide that “[p]reliminary and 
postliminary activities and time spent in eating meals between 
working hours fall into this category [of work that an 
employer may compensate his employees for even though he 
12 
 
is not obligated to do so under the FLSA.]  The agreement of 
the parties to provide compensation for such hours may or 
may not convert them into hours worked, depending on 
whether or not it appears from all the pertinent facts that the 
parties have agreed to treat such time as hours worked.”  29 
C.F.R. § 778.320.    
 
 Thus, if the time at issue is considered hours worked 
under the Act, the corresponding compensation is included in 
the regular rate of pay.  29 C.F.R. § 778.223.  Whether or not 
the time is considered hours worked under the Act, however, 
if the time is regarded by the parties as working time, “the 
payment is nevertheless included in the regular rate of pay 
unless it qualifies for exclusion from the regular rate as one of 
a type of ‘payments made for occasional periods when no 
work is performed due to failure of the employer to provide 
sufficient work, or other similar cause’ as discussed in § 
778.218 or is excludable on some other basis under section 
7(e)(2).”5  Id.  
                                              
 5 The regulations appear somewhat inconsistent as to 
whether payments made for meal breaks may be excluded 
from the regular rate pursuant to the exception listed at 
section 207(e)(2).  One part of the regulations states that the 
exclusion described in section 207(e)(2) “deals with the type 
of absences which are infrequent or sporadic or unpredictable.  
It has no relation to regular ‘absences’ such as lunch periods.”  
29 C.F.R. § 778.218.  Another section, 29 C.F.R. § 
778.320(b), makes clear that when there is an agreement to 
treat compensation given for meal breaks not as “hours 
worked,” the compensation is excluded from the regular rate 
under section 207(e)(2).  Whether compensation for meal 
breaks is excludable from the regular rate pursuant to section 
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B. Permissible Offsetting Under the FLSA 
 The FLSA explicitly states when an employer may use 
certain compensation already given to an employee as a credit 
against its overtime liability owed to that employee under the 
Act.  Offsetting with already-disbursed compensation against 
incurred overtime is discussed in section 207(h), which states: 
 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), sums 
excluded from the regular rate pursuant to 
subsection (e) shall not be creditable toward 
wages required under section 6 or overtime 
compensation required under this section. 
 
(2) Extra compensation paid as described in 
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (e) of 
this section shall be creditable toward overtime 
compensation payable pursuant to this section. 
29 U.S.C. § 207(h)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).  As noted above, 
subsection (e) sets forth the exclusions from the regular rate.  
Thus, the FLSA explicitly permits offsetting against overtime 
only with certain compensation that is statutorily excluded 
from the regular rate, that is, only three categories of 
compensation, 6 which are “extra compensation provided by a 
                                                                                                     
207(e)(2) is ultimately irrelevant in situations such as this 
one, where the employer has included it in the regular rate.   
6 The three portions of subsection (e) relevant to 
offsetting are: 
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 (5) extra compensation provided by a premium 
rate paid for certain hours worked by the 
employee in any day or workweek because 
such hours are hours worked in excess of 
eight in a day or in excess of the maximum 
workweek applicable to such employee 
under subsection (a) or in excess of the 
employee’s normal working hours or 
regular working hours, as the case may be; 
 
(6) extra compensation provided by a premium 
rate paid for work by the employee on 
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular 
days of rest, or on the sixth or seventh day 
of the workweek, where such premium rate 
is not less than one and one-half times the 
rate established in good faith for like work 
performed in nonovertime hours on other 
days; 
 
(7) extra compensation provided by a premium 
rate paid to the employee, in pursuance of 
an applicable employment contract or 
collective-bargaining agreement, for work 
outside of the hours established in good 
faith by the contract or agreement as the 
basic, normal, or regular workday (not 
exceeding eight hours) or workweek (not 
exceeding the maximum workweek 
applicable to such employee under 
subsection (a) of this section, where such 
premium rate is not less than one and one-
15 
 
premium rate.”  Id. § 207(e)(5)-(7).  Unlike the compensation 
addressed by the other exclusions, the three categories of 
excludable compensation that qualify for the offsetting 
provision at section 207(h)(2) are paid at a premium rate.  
Accordingly, we have previously characterized these three 
categories listed in section 207(e)(5)-(7) as “dollar-for-dollar 
credit[s] for premium pay” and limited permissible employer 
offsets to only those premium payments.  See Wheeler v. 
Hampton Twp., 399 F.3d 238, 245 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
regulations also support limiting employers’ ability to offset 
overtime liability.  Only extra compensation that falls within 
sections 207(e)(5), (6), and (7) may be creditable—“[n]o 
other types of remuneration for employment may be so 
credited.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 778.201(c). 
 
IV. 
 Nothing in the FLSA authorizes the type of offsetting 
DuPont advances here, where an employer seeks to credit 
compensation that it included in calculating an employee’s 
regular rate of pay against its overtime liability.  Rather, the 
statute only provides for an offset of an employer’s overtime 
liability using other compensation excluded from the regular 
rate pursuant to sections 207(e)(5)-(7) and paid to an 
employee at a premium rate. 
                                                                                                     
half times the rate established in good faith 
by the contract or agreement for like work 
performed during such workday or 
workweek; . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(5)-(7).  
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 In Wheeler, as here, the employer, Hampton 
Township, had voluntarily included non-work pay—which 
did not need to be included in the regular rate under the Act—
in the regular rate calculation.  It sought to offset 
compensation it was required to include in the regular rate, 
but did not, with compensation it voluntarily chose to include 
in the regular rate.  Wheeler, 399 F.3d at 243.  We held that 
this was not permitted.  We could not find any “textual reason 
to ‘credit’ the Township for including such pay in its regular 
rate.”  Id. at 244.  We explained that “while § 207(e) protects 
the Township from having to include non-work pay in the 
regular rate, it does not authorize the Township now to 
require such augments to be stripped out, or to take a credit 
for including such augments.”  Id.  In essence, at the point at 
which compensation is included in the regular rate (regardless 
of whether the Act required it be included), an employer may 
not use that compensation to offset other compensation owed 
under the Act.  We determined that “[w]here a credit is 
allowed, the statute says so.”  Id. at 245.  The Township was 
not entitled to a credit under the explicit offset contemplated 
by section 207(h), so we concluded that the FLSA did not 
permit the offset.  Id. (“The Township seeks a credit for 
allegedly including non-work pay—presumably at a non-
premium rate—in the CBA’s basic annual salary.  The FLSA 
does not provide for such an offset.”).  
 
 We based our conclusion that offsetting was limited to 
the type addressed by section 207(h) on our recognition that 
Section 207(h) offsetting pertained only to “extra 
compensation,” which is distinct from regular straight time 
pay.  Wheeler, 399 F.3d at 245.  Indeed, “such ‘extra 
compensation’ is a kind of overtime compensation, and thus 
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need not be added to the regular rate.  Likewise, such 
compensation may be credited against the Act’s required 
overtime pay.”  Id.  Courts have widely recognized that an 
employer may offset its overtime liability with accumulated 
premium pay given to employees under sections 207(e)(5)-
(7).  See, e.g., Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 828 (5th 
Cir. 2003); Kohlheim v. Glynn Cty, 915 F.2d 1473, 1481 
(11th Cir. 1990).  The offset created by section 207(h) is 
logical because it authorizes employers to apply one type of 
premium pay to offset another, both of which are excluded 
from the regular rate.7  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(e).  It is 
undisputed that the compensation paid for meal breaks was 
included in plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay, and thus could not 
qualify as “extra compensation.”  Accordingly, DuPont may 
not avail itself of the offset provisions explicitly allowed by § 
207(h)(2). 
 
 DuPont argues that the FLSA’s failure to expressly 
prohibit offsetting where the compensation used to offset is 
included in the regular rate indicates that offsetting is 
allowed.  We disagree with DuPont’s notion that the FLSA’s 
silence indicates permission.  While it is true that the statute 
                                              
 7 The “premium” nature of compensation referenced in 
§ 207(h)(2) is important.  Indeed, at least one court has not 
allowed offsetting unless the premium payment made was 
one and one-half times the regular rate of pay, or equivalent 
to the overtime rate.  See O’Brien v. Town of Agawam, 508 F. 
Supp. 2d 142, 146 (D. Mass. 2007) (“Because the payments 
at issue are less than one-and-one-half times Plaintiffs’ 
regular rate of pay, they cannot be used to offset the Town’s 
overall liability, regardless of when or how these payments 
were made.”).   
18 
 
does not explicitly set forth this prohibition, the policy 
rationales underlying the FLSA do not permit crediting 
compensation used in calculating an employee’s regular rate 
of pay because it would allow employers to double-count the 
compensation.  The DOL convincingly urges this viewpoint.  
It observes that “[t]here is no authority for the proposition 
that compensation already paid for hours of work can be used 
as an offset and thereby be counted a second time as 
statutorily required compensation for other hours of work.”  
DOL Letter Br. 6.  Further, “there is no reason to distinguish 
between compensation for productive work time and 
compensation for bona fide meal breaks.”  Id.  Compensation 
included in, and used in calculating, the regular rate of pay is 
reflective of the first forty hours worked.  We agree with the 
reasoning of the DOL that allowing employers to then credit 
that compensation against overtime would necessarily 
shortchange employees.   
 The statutory scheme that limits crediting to the three 
types of “extra compensation” excluded from the regular rate 
against overtime obligations makes sense.  “To permit 
overtime premium to enter into the computation of the regular 
rate would be to allow overtime premium on overtime 
premium—a pyramiding that Congress could not have 
intended.”  Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 
464 (1948).  Excludable premium compensation may offset 
other excludable premium compensation.  To allow 
compensation included in the regular rate to offset premium-
rate pay, however, would facilitate a “pyramiding” in the 
opposite direction by allowing employers to pay straight time 
and overtime together.  This approach fundamentally 
conflicts with the FLSA’s concern that employees be 
compensated for all hours worked.  As the Ninth Circuit 
observed in Ballaris, “it would undermine the purpose of the 
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FLSA if an employer could use agreed-upon compensation 
for non-work time (or work time) as a credit so as to avoid 
paying compensation required by the FLSA.”  Ballaris, 370 
F.3d at 914.   
 
 While Ballaris is distinguishable because the employer 
in that case excluded meal break compensation when 
calculating the employee’s regular rate and the parties agreed 
that the meal break period was excluded from each 
employee’s hours worked, its reasoning nonetheless applies 
here.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[c]rediting money 
already due an employee for some other reason against the 
wage he is owed is not paying that employee the 
compensation to which he is entitled by statute.  It is, instead, 
false and deceptive ‘creative’ bookkeeping that, if tolerated, 
would frustrate the goals and purposes of the FLSA.” 370 
F.3d at 914 (internal footnote omitted).  Here, permitting 
DuPont to use pay given for straight time—and included in 
the regular rate of pay—as an offset against overtime pay is 
precisely the type of “creative bookkeeping” that the Ninth 
Circuit cautioned against and the FLSA sought to eradicate.   
 
While the District Court cited Wheeler in passing, it 
did not apply our holding but, instead, looked at the two 
circumstances that the statute expressly states preclude 
offsetting by an employer: 
 
First, employers cannot use paid non-work time 
to offset unpaid work time when the paid non-
work time is excluded from the regular rate of 
pay.  Second, if the parties agree to treat paid 
non-work time as “hours worked,” and this time 
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is included in the regular rate of pay, the 
employer cannot offset.  
 
App. 12.  The District Court concluded that because neither 
of these circumstances was present in this case, the FLSA 
does not expressly prohibit an offset.  It recited the 
prohibition set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 207(h)(1), which 
generally bars employers from offsetting incurred overtime 
liability with sums excluded from the regular rate of pay.  The 
District Court observed that “defendants cannot offset if the 
FLSA expressly excludes plaintiffs meal periods—non-work 
time—from plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay.”  App. 12-13.  
After reviewing section 207(e)’s list of mandatory exclusions 
from the regular rate of pay, it concluded that the one 
category of exclusions that was arguably implicated by the 
facts, 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2), was not applicable because the 
meal periods were not the type of absences covered by the 
exclusion. “Accordingly, section 207(e)(2) does not prohibit 
defendants from including plaintiffs’ meal period time in their 
regular rate of pay, rendering section 207(h)’s prohibition 
against an offset inapplicable.”  App. 14.  Thus, like DuPont, 
the District Court focused on the lack of express prohibition.  
In light of our holding in Wheeler that offsetting is limited to 
circumstances where an employer is paying “extra 
compensation” at a premium rate, we reject the District 
Court’s reasoning that the absence of a direct prohibition 
controls the analysis of the offset issue. 
 
 Moreover, we do not accept the significance that the 
District Court and DuPont place on two lingering issues: first, 
whether the parties had an agreement to treat the breaks in 
question as hours worked, and second, whether the FLSA 
required DuPont to compensate the employees for the breaks 
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in question.  With respect to the former, both the Ninth 
Circuit in Ballaris and the FLSA’s implementing regulations 
advance the notion that employers may not offset if there is 
an agreement to treat otherwise uncompensable time as 
“hours worked,” and the compensation at issue is included in 
the regular rate.  But inclusion in the regular rate is sufficient 
for our purposes, as noted above, so the existence of an 
agreement is beside the point. 8  As to the latter, 29 C.F.R § 
785.19 simply states that employers are not required by the 
FLSA to treat meal breaks as hours worked, but it does not 
prohibit them from doing so.  Indeed, section 778.320 
expressly contemplates that an employer may agree to treat 
non-work time, including meal breaks, as compensable hours 
worked.   
 
 The District Court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704 (7th 
Cir. 1996), and the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Avery v. City 
of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 1994), in concluding 
that DuPont could offset using meal break compensation.  
The two opinions did not analyze the offset issue in detail, but 
instead focused on compensability.  The courts in both 
Barefield and Avery presumed an offset was permissible and 
                                              
 8 Ultimately, the District Court rejected Plaintiffs’ 
argument that there was an agreement to treat the meal 
periods as hours worked, stating that DuPont’s decision to 
compensate for meal breaks did not convert them into hours 
worked, the policy did not create a contract deeming the time 
hours worked, and the meal periods were bona fide. “Ergo, 
the FLSA does not expressly preclude defendants from 
offsetting plaintiffs[’] unpaid donning and doffing and shift 
relief time with the paid meal period time.”  App. 25. 
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focused on the fact that the FLSA did not require employers 
to compensate employees for the bona fide meal break 
periods at issue.  Notably, neither opinion addresses the most 
relevant provision in the FLSA on the issue of offsetting—29 
U.S.C. 207(h).  Given our holding in Wheeler, limiting 
offsetting to “extra compensation” not included in the regular 
rate, it is irrelevant whether the breaks were compensable. 
 
V. 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will reverse the 
District Court’s decision of November 5, 2014, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
